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Introduction
The certification of aircraft systems has traditionally been founded
on a risk-based approach that balances the severity of the hazards caused
by a system failure against the probability of their occurrence. While this
approach works well for essential aircraft functions, such as airspeed or
altitude indications, it can hamper the adoption of new safety systems.
This is because the benefits of such systems are not generally accounted
for in the certification process, which is only concerned with the potential
hazards and failure probabilities arising from their incorporation.
This paper proposes the application of Signal Detection Theory
(SDT) concepts to optimize the risk/benefit ratio for the certification of
optional equipment that is intended to enhance aviation safety and/or
operational effectiveness. In many cases, the proposed method would
lower the certification barriers for the deployment of such systems,
leading to potentially significant aviation safety benefits, as exemplified
by the introduction of airbags into automobiles.
Air bags were available as optional equipment for passenger cars
beginning in the early 1970s, but their installation remained optional until
the passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991, which made them mandatory for the front seat occupants of all
passenger automobiles and light trucks. Although it was quickly
recognized that airbags could convey significant safety benefits, they also
carried two major risks: unwarranted deployment, and serious injury or
death to vehicle occupants of small stature, such as children. The decision
to mandate airbag fitment resulted from their overwhelming benefits,
despite these potential drawbacks. Unfortunately, aircraft certification
regulations do not use the risk-benefit analysis that led to the widespread
adoption of life-saving air bags in automobiles.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC)
23.1309-E provides guidance for the system safety analysis and
assessment for Part 23 airplanes. The decision tree incorporated in the
guidance addresses adverse effects, failures, malfunctions and hazards, but
makes no mention of benefits (FAA, 2011, p. 17). Similarly, Figure 2 of
the FAA document defines the “relationship among airplane classes,
probabilities, severity of failure conditions, and software and complex
hardware and Design Assurance Level” (FAA, 2011, p. 23), but no
mention is made of the potential benefits, or their likelihood, of the system
being installed. This same risk-based philosophy is carried over to other
important advisory material, including the guidance for software
certification (RTCA, 2012), complex hardware (RTCA, 2000) and system
safety analysis (SAE, 2010).
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The following material develops the mathematical basis for the
application of SDT and Bayesian methods to the certification of optional
aircraft systems. The discussion begins with a review of SDT principles,
which are then mapped to their counterparts in the certification domain.
The concepts of cost and efficiency are then applied to optimize the
risk/benefit ratio for the system under investigation. The discussion
concludes with a case study of the method’s application to an Electronic
Flight Bag (EFB) software application.
Signal Detection Theory Basics
Signal Detection Theory was initially formulated by Peterson,
Birdsall, and Fox (1954) and extended by Tanner and Swets (1954) and
Green and Swets (1966). Abdi (2009) extended SDT beyond the literal
interpretation of physical parameters into the domains of abstract or
metaphorical signals, which is pertinent to the current context. An early
applications of Signal Detection Theory was to model human operator
performance during target detection tasks on early radar displays. These
devices suffered high levels of noise in relation to the relatively weak
signal strength of the target, making the detection task difficult and
probabilistic. In such situations, the radar operator and the radar each can
have two states, resulting in four possible SDT system combinations:
1. A target is present on the display (a Signal), and it is detected
by the operator – a Hit
2. A target is present, and is not detected – a Miss
3. No target is present, but one is detected (i.e. noise is mistaken
for the target) – a False Alarm (FA)
4. No target is present, and none is detected – a Correct Rejection
(CR)
In the following discussion, the meanings of Hit, Miss, FA, and
CR are to be interpreted in the SDT context. The Hit and CR states
represent the ideal operation of the system, and they may have associate
benefits. Conversely, misses and FAs are undesirable, and each has an
associated cost. For example, the result of a Miss could be the destruction
of one’s vessel by a hostile party. Equally, an FA could result in the
destruction of an innocent (non-target) party by our weapon system.
The final variable is the Decision Criterion adopted by the
operator, which defines the operator’s Response Bias. The response bias of
a risky operator results in more detected signals, leading to greater
numbers of hits and accompanying FAs. Conversely, a conservative
operator would incur more Misses but fewer FAs. A hypothetical unbiased
ideal operator sets the decision criterion in an optimum manner to
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minimize undesirable Misses and FAs. Any deviation from the ideal
threshold represents a conservative or liberal bias.
The Response Bias adopted by the operator is also affected by the
likelihood of a signal being observed, as well as by the costs and benefits
of acting on a perceived signal. For example, if the likelihood of a signal
and the cost of a Miss are both high (e.g. an incoming missile is both
likely and catastrophic), then the operator would be very likely to perceive
every stimulus as a target. On the other hand, if the cost of an FA were
high (e.g. downing a civilian airliner), and the target probability extremely
low (e.g. in peacetime), the operator would be unlikely to respond unless
the target signal was overpowering.
The importance of SDT is that it allows an exact calculation of the
optimum Response Bias, given known likelihoods of observing a signal,
and with defined costs and benefits (Wickens, 1992, p. 29). This is a
striking conclusion that forms the link between SDT and the aeronautical
certification domain, with its highly probabilistic foundations.
SDT Definitions
At any given moment, time t, the signal can have one of two states:
Condition C0 – the signal is absent;
Condition C1 – a signal is present.
The system produces output data, x(t), corresponding to the signal
state. The operator will act on this data to make one of the following
decisions or judgments:
Decision D0 – the signal is absent;
Decision D1 – a signal is present.
Accordingly, SDT yields four possible system states, defined as follows:
D1C1 – Hit;
D0C1 – Miss;
D1C0 – False Alarm; and
D0C0 – Correct Rejection.
Let:
P(C0) be the a-priori probability of event C0 and
P(C1) be the a-priori probability of event C1, then:
Events C1 and C0 are complementary, so P(C0) = 1 - P(C1).
In practice, the absolute probabilities P(D1C1), P(D0C1), P(D1C0),
and P(D0C0) are usually unknown, so conditional probabilities are
substituted for the four system states identified above:
PH = P(D1|C1) is the Hit probability,
which is the conditional probability of D1, given that C1 has occurred.
Similarly:
PM = P(D0|C1) is the Miss probability.
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PM = 1 - PH, because these are the only two possible outcomes,
given the presence of a signal.
Also:
PFA = P(D1|C0) is the FA probability;
PCR = P(D0|C0) is the CR probability.
Again, PCR = 1 – PFA, because these are the only two possible
outcomes, given the absence of a signal.
SDT Costs
In SDT, there are two possible failure outcomes: Miss and False
Alarm. These generally have different negative consequences, depending
on the real-world situation. For this reason, SDT introduces two
corresponding relational error costs:
c01 – Miss Cost;
c10 – FA Cost.
SDT Average Risk
Combining these concepts, SDT characterizes the average risk
value of the system as:
R = c01PMP(C1) + c10PFAP(C0)
If all the values in (1) are known, the Bayes Criterion of Minimum
Average Risk R (R → min) yields an Optimal Detection Criterion that will
maximize the system’s Hits and minimize the False Alarms (Van Trees,
2001). Note that the optimum performance of the system does not
eliminate Misses and FAs, because of the probabilistic nature of the
system, but the Bayes Criterion does provide the optimum theoretical
system performance. The only drawback of the Bayes approach is that the
variables in (1) are not usually known. Nevertheless, the equation can be
used as a starting point for the application of SDT for certification
purposes. Before making this transition, it is necessary to examine the
probabilistic underpinnings of current certification approaches.
Failure Conditions, Failures and Errors

(1)

Aeronautical Circular 23.1309-E (FAA, 2011) defines the
following terms:
Error
An omission or incorrect action by a crewmember or maintenance
personnel, or a mistake in requirements, design, or implementation.
Failure
An occurrence that affects the operation of a component, part, or
element such that it can no longer function as intended (this includes both
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loss of function and malfunction). Note: Errors may cause failures but are
not considered failures.
Failure Condition
A condition having an effect on either the airplane or its occupants,
or both, either direct or consequential, which is caused or contributed to by
one or more failures or errors considering flight phase and relevant
adverse operational or environmental conditions or external events. Figure
2 of 23.1309-E (FAA, 2011, p. 23) places maximum bounds for different
Failure Condition severity levels as follows:
P(FCi) < Mi, i = 1, …, 4
where:
FC1 is a Minor Failure Conditions,
FC2 is a Major Failure Conditions,
FC3 is a Hazardous Failure Conditions,
FC4 is a Catastrophic Failure Conditions, and
Mi are the Maximum acceptable values corresponding to each
Failure Condition severity level.
AC 23.1309-E states:
The probability of a failure condition occurring on an "average
flight" should be determined by structured methods (see ARP 4761
for various methods) and should consider all elements (e.g.,
combinations of failures and events) that contribute to a failure
condition. If there is only an effect when failures occur in a certain
order, the calculation should account for the conditional
probability that the failures occur in the sequence necessary to
produce a failure condition (FAA, 2011, p. A3–1).
In particular, if a Failure Condition may be caused by 1 of n
mutually exclusive failures F1, …, Fn, then:
P(FC) = P(FC|F1)P(F1) + … + P(FC|Fn)P(Fn)

(2)

(3)

This is the certification equivalent of SDT equation (1) above. In
the context of an information system, (2) does not differentiate between
the different costs associated with Loss-of-Function failures (Misses) from
Hazardously Misleading ones (False Alarms). Equation (3) also takes no
account of the potential benefits of the optional system, as there are no
benefits terms in the equation. Accordingly, an optional safety system, of
the type being addressed by this paper, might be deemed uncertifiable,
despite overwhelming potential benefits. This shortcoming can be
addressed by mapping the SDT approach to the certification domain.
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Mapping SDT and Aircraft Certification Terms
The SDT concepts of Signals, Hits, Misses, FAs, CRs, and System
Average Risk can be applied to optional aircraft safety systems, whereby a
Signal is viewed as a pilot error, and a Hit is viewed as a Save by the
safety system in question. Using this approach, the SDT definitions can be
mapped to the certification environment as follows:
Signal represents an unaided pilot error when the safety system is
not installed that can cause an accident (i.e. UPE - an unaided pilot error).
An optional safety system is therefore analogous to a Signal Detection
System in SDT. The associated Signal probability is denoted by PUPE.
Hit denotes a “save” by a correctly functioning safety system,
which prevents the pilot from making an error that would otherwise have
been committed. An SDT Hit maps to a certification Save, with a
probability of PSave.
Miss denotes a safety system’s failure to prevent an error under
UPE conditions. Let’s denote Miss by NSave (No Save) and the Miss
probability by PNSave.
Correct Rejection reflects the correct operation of the system in
the absence of any pilot error.
False Alarm represents a safety system failure that results in
Hazardously Misleading (HM) data being presented, in the absence of a
UPE. The equivalent False Alarm probability is PHM.
Miss Cost denotes the conditional probability of a Failure
Condition of a specified severity level arising as a result of a safety
system’s failure to Save P(FC|NSave). This parameter broadly
characterizes the severity of the consequences of the safety system’s
failure.
False Alarm Cost denotes the conditional probability of a Failure
Condition of a specified severity level arising as a result of a safety
system’s issuing a False Alarm (or Hazardously Misleading Information)
P(FC|HM). This parameter captures the severity of the consequences of
the safety system’s issuing a false alarm.
Applying these mappings of SDT terms, the Average System Risk
from (1) can be rewritten as:
R = P(FC|NSave)PNSavePUPE + P(FC|HM)PHM(1 - PUPE)
(4)
Any possible failure in SDT can be categorized either as a Miss
(NSave) or a False Alarm (HM), which are mutually exclusive, so,
according to (3), the R in (4) is analogous to P(FCi) in the Certification
Requirement (2) above.
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The System Efficiency Concept
In (4) above, R is the risk of a Failure Condition when the system
is present. We now define Rw as the risk of the same Failure Condition
without the optional system. It follows that the system is effective if the
overall risk with the system is lower than the risk without the system
installed:
R < Rw
This is the key formula for determining any safety system efficiency.
The percentage efficiency of a safety system can be considered as:
Eff(%)= 100(Rw – R)/Rw
Let Pw(FC|UPE) be the conditional probability of specified Failure
Condition without the system, under a given UPE condition. The overall
risk of the specified Failure Conditions is therefore:
Rw = Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE
Using (4) and (7), we can rewrite the efficiency requirement (5) as:
P(FC|NSave)PNSavePUPE + P(FC|HM)PHM(1 - PUPE) <
Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE
NSave represents a failure event under a given UPE condition.
This is no different than the situation where a pilot has made an error
without the system installed, so P(FC|NSave) = Pw(FC|UPE), and (8) can
be rewritten as
Pw(FC|UPE)PNSavePUPE
+
P(FC|HM)PHM(1–PUPE)
<
Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE
Rearranging:
P(FC|HM)PHM(1 – PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPE(1 – PNSave)
By definition: (1 – PNSave) = PSave giving our final requirement:
P(FC|HM)PHM(1–PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPEPSave
This formula quantitatively defines the threshold criterion at which
the optional safety system statistically breaks even with the baseline
unmodified aircraft, taking into account both the risks and the potential
benefits of the system. The application of the preceding criterion is best
illustrated using a case study.
Case Study

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

The following example pertains to the presentation of an aircraft
position spotter during flight on an EFB-hosted electronic chart, which is
currently prohibited unless an “…installed primary flight display, weather
display, or map display also depict(s) own-ship position” (FAA, 2017, p.
15).
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The use of a spotter undoubtedly confers some operational and
safety benefits, but at the risk of misleading the crew if a software failure
leads to a hazardously misleading (HM) condition. This could arise if the
spotter is shown in the wrong position or orientation. The situation would
result in a failure condition if the pilot(s) follow the bad data, Air Traffic
Control doesn’t catch the error, etc. These probabilities can be estimated
and applied to (9) to quantitatively determine if the spotter confers a
positive safety benefit. To do so, we introduce the following events for
illustrative purposes only:
ErrSw - an untrapped software error has caused a hazardously
misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e.
no UPE);
ErrGPS - incorrect GPS or navigation input to the spotter has
caused a hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a
prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE);
ErrDB - a chart database error has caused a hazardously
misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e.
no UPE);
Nr - “Not recognized”: the crew fail to recognize the HM that the
aircraft is not at the displayed position;
E1 - the HM information is in a dangerous sense (e.g. the error
biases the crew towards an occupied runway, rather than away from it);
E2 - the crew follows the HM information, despite other visual or
navigation cues;
E3 - Air Traffic Control fails to detect the hazardous maneuver;
and
E4 - the crew action actually causes an accident (e.g. collision with
terrain, obstacles, or another aircraft).
Using the definitions above, the combined probability of
Hazardously Misleading Information from the three identified causes is:
PHM = 1 – (1–PErrSw)(1–PErrGPS)(1–PErrDB)
Nr, E1, E2, E3, and E4 are the necessary events following HM that
will lead to a Failure Condition, so:
P(FC|HM) = P(E4E3E2E1|NrHM)P(Nr|HM)
Once the crew has failed to recognize a hazardously misleading
spotter event, the probability of the subsequent events (E1-E4) leading to a
Failure Condition are identical, whether the system is present or not. For
example: ATC is no more or less likely to detect a deviation caused by an
HM-induced spotter-error than one caused by an unaided pilot error
without the system installed. Similarly, the likelihood of a random unaided
pilot error (UPE) being in a dangerous sense is identical to the probability
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that a random HM software error is also in a dangerous sense. For
example: random software and pilot errors would be expected to have
equal probabilities of biasing the crew towards, or away from, an occupied
runway. Summarizing this concept:
P(E4E3E2E1|NrHM) = Pw(FC|UPE)
Using (11) and (12), the system efficiency criterion (9) can be
rewritten as:
Pw(FC|UPE)P(Nr|HM)PHM(1–PUPE) < Pw(FC|UPE)PUPEPSave
Simplifying:
P(Nr|HM)PHM(1–PUPE) < PUPEPSave
This formula makes an interesting contrast with the standard
certification requirement we saw in (2): P(FCi) < Mi, i = 1, …, 4.
For the electronic chart spotter, formulas (10) and (13) can be
combined to calculate the maximum acceptable probability of an
untrapped software error leading to an HM event:
1–(1–PErrSw)(1–PErrGPS)(1–PErrDB) < PSavePUPE/(P(Nr|HM)(1–PUPE))
Formula (14) yields a quantified measure of the required system
reliability. The final step in the analysis is to examine the variation of the
maximum allowable probability of a Hazardously Misleading software
error PErrSw. This is best visualized graphically, and requires the
introduction of three final constructs.
PSave and P(Nr|HM) in (14) are difficult to calculate with absolute
accuracy, but a solution can be derived by revisiting the automobile airbag
example used in the introduction. It is doubtful that accurate figures could
be derived for airbag “saves” and for “losses” caused by malfunctioning
airbags. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of the save ratio can be
estimated. The same analogy applies to the un-quantified probabilities
above: the order of magnitude of the ratio PSave/P(Nr|HM) can be
estimated, with sufficient accuracy for this analysis. This ratio is used as
abscissa for the required system reliability plot.
Similarly, the effect of a wide range of PUPE values should be
examined in order to determine the system sensitivity to the probability of
Unaided Pilot Errors. For this reason, (14) is used to produce a family of
curves for varying PUPE values. These have been bounded within a range
of range 10-2 -10-4 because the former would represent many thousands of
errors every day, when viewed across all flight operations worldwide.
Conversely, the latter would imply that a representative 20,000-hour pilot
has only made one such error in his or her career, based on an average
stage-length of two hours.
The last assumption relates to the values for PErrGPS and PErrDB.
These are effectively the probabilities of a hazardously misleading GPS
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position (independent of the EFB and its software), and of a hazardous
chart database error. These probabilities can be derived in a number of
ways, including service history and FOQA data reviews, but for the
purpose of the case study, they are arbitrarily assigned the following
values:
PErrGPS = 10-6
PErrDB = 10-5
Figure 1 illustrates the result of applying the preceding
assumptions to (14). The y-axis (max. acceptable PErrSw) has a logarithmic
scale with the inverse order of values.

Figure 1. Minimum Acceptable Software Reliability as a Function of
System Benefit/ Risk Analysis.
The following example illustrate the practical application of Figure
1. Assuming that the pilot’s probability of making an unaided error is 10-3,
and that the system saves 25 times as often as it hazardously misleads,
then the required system reliability to achieve a net beneficial effect is
approximately 2.5 x 10-2. This corresponds to DO-178C Level D software
(RTCA, 2012), which is achievable by Commercial-Off-The Shelf
(COTS) products and applications. If this performance requirement is
exceeded, the optional system would yield a positive safety improvement
over the baseline, even though the assumed reliability is several orders of
magnitude below that required for navigation systems.
Figure 1 also shows that the software reliability must be increased
(i.e. the failure rate must decrease), when either of the following occurs:
1. The pilot becomes more reliable; and/or
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2. The system Save/Unrecognized Hazard ratio decreases.
Conclusions
Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian optimization methods can
be applied to the certification of optional aircraft systems, and a formal
method has been developed that allows the numerical optimization of the
risk/benefit ratio of such systems. Using representative data from the case
study of a spotter on an electronic chart, it has been demonstrated that
safety benefits would be achieved, even with the software reliability levels
typically associated with COTS software such as Windows™ which are
significantly below the current certification standards. The method makes
few domain assumptions, and is based on the underpinnings of SDT and
Bayesian probability theory, with well-established validity and reliability.
Accordingly, the technique should have broad application to the
certification of all optional aircraft systems.
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Nomenclature
ATC – Air Traffic Control
CR – Correct Rejection
E1 - the HM information is in a dangerous sense (e.g. the error biases the
crew towards an occupied runway, rather than away from it)
E2 - the crew follows the HM information, despite other visual or
navigation cues
E3 - Air Traffic Control fails to detect the hazardous maneuver
E4 - the crew action actually causes an accident (e.g. collision with terrain,
obstacles, or another aircraft)
ErrDB - a chart database error has caused a hazardously misleading (HM)
condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE)
ErrGPS - incorrect GPS or navigation input to the spotter has caused a
hazardously misleading (HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing
pilot error (i.e. no UPE)
ErrSw - an untrapped software error has caused a hazardously misleading
(HM) condition, in the absence of a prevailing pilot error (i.e. no UPE)
FA – False Alarm
FAA – Federal Aviation Administration
FC – Failure Condition
FOQA – Flight Operations Quality Assurance
HM – Hazardously Misleading
Nr - “Not recognized”: the crew fail to recognize the HM that the aircraft
is not at the displayed position
NSave – No Save
P – Probability
R – Risk of a failure condition when the system is present
Rw – Risk of the same failure condition Without the system
RTCA - Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
SAE – Society of Automotive Engineers
UPE - Unaided Pilot Error
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